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Oil Supply Shocks and the u.S. Economy
The price of oil fell by more than fifty percent in
the first half of 1986. This dramatic decline led
many observers to predict that a surge in the
growth of real output was just around the cor-
ner. Yet the predicted acceleration in real output
growth has not materialized so far. On the sur-
face, the economy's response to the large price
decline appears to differ from what past experi-
ence would suggest. For example, the large
increase in the price of oil in 1973 was followed
immediately by a significant contraction in
aggregate output. By the same token, the price
decline of early 1986 should have led to a
strong surge in real output growth by now.
In this Letter, we argue that past experiences
with changes in the price of oil and subsequent
changes in economic activity in the u.s. econ-
omy have been misinterpreted. This misin-
terpretation has resulted from a failure to
consider the effect of changes in the foreign
exchange value ofthe dollar. We use the oil
price shock of 1973 and subsequent economic
developments to demonstrate that oil price
shocks do not appear to have had a very large
impact on real output in.the past - once the
effects ofthe dollar exchange rate are taken into
account. Consequently, it is not very surprising
that real GNP has failed to grow rapidly over the
past year contrary to what was widely expected
immediately following the oil price decline.
Effects of oil supply shocks
Along with labor and capital, energy is an input
to theproduction process, and oil is an impor-
tant component oftotal energy sources. A
decrease in the price of oil due to a sudden
increase in available supplies, for example,
allows businesses to increase the amount of oil
they use. This increase in energy input leads to
an increase in production.
A decrease in the price of oil has other effects as
well. The drop in price redistributes income
between the u.s. and the rest of the world
because the u.S. is a net importer of oil. The
decrease in the price of oil can be compared to
a tax cut for consumers that leads to an increase
in spending.
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Within u.S. industry, an oil price decline
redistributes profits from oil-producing to oil-
consuming firms. Just as oil-consuming indus-
tries react to a decrease in the price of oil by
increasing output, industries involved in the pro-
duction of oil will react by decreasing output. A
permanently lower oil price makes it unprofita-
ble to explore and drill for oil in previously prof-.
itable locations. This leads, in turn, to decreased
production in industries that supply oil-produc-
ing firms with inputs.
Thus, the overall effects of an oil price drop on
real output will depend upon the relative magni-
tudes of the effects on oil-producing and oil-
consuming sectors. While the price increases of
the 1970s focused our attention on the oil-
consuming sectors ofthe economy, the large
declines in both production and employment in
the oil industry following the large drop in the
price of oil in 1986 suggest that the impact upon
the oil-producing sector may be substantial as
well.
Theory, while able to tell us how particular sec-
tors will be affected, cannot predict the overall
response of real output to changes in the supply
of oil. To make such a prediction, we must
examine what actually occurred after each of
the shocks.
Unfortunately, casual examination of the events
immediately following the oil price shocks also
does not provide an unambiguous answer. The
oil price increase of 1973 was followed by a
substantial decline in the rate of output growth,
with the economy entering a recession in late
1974. At that time, it seemed natural to attribute
the recession to the large jump in the price of
oil. Indeed, popular views of the effect of oil
price shocks are based largely on an analysis of
subsequent economic developments.
However, the picture was considerably muddied
following the oil shock of 1979. Following that
episode, real output behaved quite differently
even though the percentage increase in the price
of oil was of the same order of magnitude as in
1973. (Analysts generally attribute the briefFRBSF
recession in mid-1980 to the imposition of credit
controls.) And, as noted earlier, the events fol-
lowing the 1986 episode seem to contradict the
developments that followed the jump in oil
prices in 1973.
One important difference between 1986 and the
earlier oil shock episodes has to do with the
existence of price controls. These controls kept
the domestic oil industry from benefiting from
higheroil prices even after the sharp increases of
the 1970s, whiletheincrease in the price of
imported oil had a negative impact upon con-
sumers. Thus, only the negative aspects of the
oil price increase manifested themselves. It is
likely that in a deregulated environment the
effects of an oil price increase would have been
less severe than they actually were in the 1970s.
Yet this explanation does not appear to be the
entire story. While the outputof the oil pro-
ducers has declined dramatically as a result of
the sharp price decline of early 1986, there does
not seem to have been a noticeable increase in
the output of industries that consume oil a
response that we would have expected on the
basis.of past experience.
The dollar and the price of oil
Taking account ofthe role played by the dollar
provides at least a partial reconciliation ofthese
apparent contradictions intheresponse of real
output growth to changes in the pIke of oil. The
value ofthe dollar has an important influence on
the price of oil because crudeoiltradedin
world markets is priced in dollars. If the value of
the dollar falls, oil-importing nations (other than
the U.s.) will find that the price of oil in terms of
their own currencies has fallen, Consequently,
their consumption of oil will go up. At the same
time, oil exporte'rs will discover that the price of
oil measured in theircurrencies has declined.
They will therefore reduce the quantity of oil
they are willing to supply at the prevailing dollar
price, Both responseswilltend to raise the dollar
price ofoil. Thus,all else being equal, a
decrease in the value of the dollarwill lead to
an increasein the dollar price of oil, while an
increase in the value of the dollar will lead to a
decrease in the dollar price of oil.
Oil prices were relativelystable until approx-
imately 1970, as was the dollar. Both "oil
shocks" ofthe 1970s were preceded by large
declines in the value of the dollar. And the large
increase in the value of the dollar in the early
1980s was accompanied by falling oil prices.
Statistical tests further confirm the existence of
this relationship between oil prices and the dol-
lar. Exchange rates account for close to half of
the variation in oil prices over the period from
the late 19505 to the endof 1985.
These findings imply that, given the behavior of
the dollar, the price of oil would have increased
in the 1970s and decreased in the 1980s even in
the absence of OPEC. As discussed in a previous
Letter (December 19, 1986), OPEC's influence
lay in accentuating these movements, that is, in
causing large; sudden jumps in the price of oil.
Implications
Analysts therefore may have overestimated the
role played by OPEC induced supply shocks in
determining the price of oil, and simultaneously
underestimated the role of changes in the value
of the dollar. By ignoring the effects of the
dollar, they have mismeasured supply shocks
and exaggerated the effects of a change in the
price of oil on aggregate output. More specifi-
cally, some of the effects ofexchange rate
changes have been ascribed to changes in the
price of oil. (Statistical analysis reveals that these
effects are quite complex. For example, while a
fall in the value of the dollar leads to higher real
output initially, this is followed by a decrease in
output that more than offsets the initial increase.)
Formal empirical tests on data over 1959-1985
support this view. While changes in the price of
oil have a significant impact on real output
when no other variables are taken into account,
inclusion of the exchange rate noticeably
reduces the impact of oil price changes on real
GNP.
Examining the 1973 episode
Since the 1973 oil shock and the subsequent
economic contraction form an important partof
the popular understanding of the effects of oil
supply shocks, we decided to re-examine the
impact of oil shocks on aggregate output over
that period - with explicit consideration of
changes in the exchange value of the dollar.
Real output contracted shortly after the price of
oil increased in 1973. However, that by itself
does not prove that the recession was caused by
the oil price shock since aggregate output is sub-




The Impact of Oil Price
















shocks that actually took place. Oil price shocks
appear to have exerted a negative effect on real
output growth over 1974. They made their
strongest impact in the fourth quarter of 1974,
when they reduced growth by close to three per-
cent (at an annual rate).
Would this impact have been sufficient to push
the economy into recession? The answer is no.
Chart 2 shows that real GNP decreased at an
approximately four percent annual rate in the
third and fourth quarters of 1974, and atclose to
an eight percent annual rate in the first quarter
oH 975. The chart also shows the forecast of
real GNP growth that we would have made at
the end of 1972 had we known about the oil
price shocks to come. The vertical distance
between the forecast value and actual output
growth provides a measure of the role played by
developments other than oil price shocks in
determining real GNP growth in different quar-
ters during that period.
Chart 1 shows how our real GNP forecast for the
period 1973-1975 was revised when we added
. information about the unpredictable oil price
effects of the oil price shock, we first forecast
real GNP over 1973-75 using information about
real output, inflation, the price of oil and the
exchange rate up to the end of 1972 only. We
then examine how this forecast would have
changed if we had known about the unpredict-
able shocks to the price of oil over the same
period. If the addition of these shocks leads to a
large downward revision in the model's forecast,
then we can conclude that the oil price shock
had a considerable impact on subsequent eco-
nomic activity.
Bharat Trehan
The chart reveals, first, that we would have pre-
dicted that the rate of output growth would slow
down over 1973 and turn slightly negative in the
first quarter of 1974. However, this pattern can-
not be attributed to the oil price shocks since
Chart 1 shows that the shocks actually had a
slightly positive impact on real output growth
over this period. Instead, our analysis suggests
that the conditions for a slowdown in real output
were already in place before 1973. Second, the
chart shows that even with prior knowledge of
these shocks, we would have predicted nothing
close to the severity of the actual recession over
1974-75. Clearly, then, the recession during this
period cannot be attributed to oil price shocks.
Conclusions
This Letter has examined the question ofwhy the
large oil price decline in early 1986 did not lead
to an acceleration in real output growth. We
have used the 1973 episode to illustrate the
argument that, once the effects of exchange rate
changes are taken into account, oil price shocks
do not have a very large impact on aggregate
output. Consequently, it is not very surprising
that the large decline in oil prices in early 1986
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 207,103 396 4,602 2.2
Loans and Leases1 6 186,019 91 3,070 1.6
Commercial and Industrial 54,600 - 274 1,708 3.2
Real estate 67,038 - 6 1,138 1.7
Loans to Individuals 38,585 - 220 - 1,996 - 4.9
Leases 5,472 °
- 251 - 4.3
U. S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 13,920 285 2,924 26.5
OtherSecurities2 7,163 19 - 1,394 - 16.2
Total Deposits 205,378 - 3,920 6,773 3.4
Demand Deposits 50,635 - 3,445 5,001 10.9
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 35,660 613 - 6,223 - 14.8
OtherTransaction Balances4 18,832 - 477 4,185 28.5
TotaL Non-Transaction Balances6 135,912 3 - 2,412 - 1.7
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 46,953 - 317 1,429 3.1
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 32,640 248 - 6,118 - 15.7
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 26,764 - 1,724 - 573 - 2.0
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)jDeficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes lossreserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings ac.counts with telephone transfers
5 Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items not shown separately
7 Annualized percent change